Secure Distributed State Estimation of an LTI System over Time-Varying
  Networks and Analog Erasure Channels by Mitra, Aritra & Sundaram, Shreyas
ar
X
iv
:1
80
1.
08
91
2v
1 
 [c
s.S
Y]
  2
6 J
an
 20
18
Secure Distributed State Estimation of an LTI system over
Time-varying Networks and Analog Erasure Channels
Aritra Mitra and Shreyas Sundaram
Abstract—We study the problem of collaboratively estimat-
ing the state of an LTI system monitored by a network of
sensors, subject to the following important practical consider-
ations: (i) certain sensors might be arbitrarily compromised
by an adversary and (ii) the underlying communication graph
governing the flow of information across sensors might be
time-varying. We first analyze a scenario involving intermittent
communication losses that preserve certain information flow
patterns over bounded intervals of time. By equipping the sen-
sors with adequate memory, we show that one can obtain a fully
distributed, provably correct state estimation algorithm that
accounts for arbitrary adversarial behavior, provided certain
conditions are met by the network topology. We then argue
that our approach can handle bounded communication delays
as well. Next, we explore a case where each communication
link stochastically drops packets based on an analog erasure
channel model. For this setup, we propose state estimate update
and information exchange rules, along with conditions on the
network topology and packet drop probabilities, that guarantee
mean-square stability despite arbitrary adversarial attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a scenario where a group of sensors deployed
over a geographical network seek to cooperatively estimate
the state of a dynamical process. This general setup con-
stitutes the standard distributed state estimation problem and
finds applications in various domains such as power systems,
transportation networks, automated factories, and distributed
robotics. As envisioned in [1], to fully leverage the benefits
of a distributed sensor network as described above, one must
design algorithms and networks that can respond to dynamic
environments involving unreliable components. In particular,
the growing need for designing secure networked control
systems necessitates the design of localized algorithms that
operate reliably in the face of adversarial sensor attacks.
In this context, unavoidable network-induced issues such as
communication losses and delays offer additional degrees of
freedom for adversaries to devise carefully crafted attacks,
thereby significantly compounding the estimation problem.1
In light of the above discussion, the design of attack-resilient,
provably correct distributed state estimation algorithms that
account for various types of communication losses and
delays will be the subject of our present investigation.
Related Work: The classical distributed state estimation
problem as described above, has been studied extensively
over the past decade; however, single-time-scale algorithms
that solve such problems under the most general conditions
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1We discuss how adversaries can use communication losses and delays
to their advantage later in the paper.
on the system and network have been proposed only recently
in [2]–[5]. While the problem of detecting and mitigating
various forms of data-injection attacks in deterministic [6]–
[8] and stochastic [9], [10] centralized2 systems is now
well understood, tackling adversarial behavior in the context
of distributed state estimation remains largely unexplored.
The limited literature that seeks to address this problem
either provides no theoretical guarantees [11], [12] or limits
the class of admissible attacks [13]. In an initial effort to
bridge the gap between centralized and distributed secure
state estimation, we recently developed a distributed observer
that allows each non-compromised sensor to asymptotically
recover the entire state dynamics despite arbitrary adver-
sarial sensor attacks, under appropriate conditions on the
network topology [14]. However, our proposed technique did
not account for the challenges introduced by communication
drop-outs or delays. This leads us to the contributions of the
present paper.
Contributions: Our contributions are twofold. First, in
Section IV, we consider a communication loss model where
certain information flow patterns are preserved deterministi-
cally over bounded intervals of time. For this communication
loss model, we show how sensors equipped with memory
can process delayed state estimates received from neighbors
(some of whom can be potentially adversarial) to asymp-
totically estimate the state of the system. Our algorithm is
inspired by recent work that addresses the resilient consensus
problem in asynchronous settings [15], [16]. As a byproduct
of our analysis, we argue that the proposed strategy accounts
for bounded communication delays as well. We also char-
acterize the convergence rate of our algorithm in terms of
the system instability, the upper bound on the delay, and
certain properties of the underlying communication graph.
The second main result of the paper, presented in Section
VI, pertains to a network whose communication links are
modeled as analog erasure channels that may or may not
introduce random delays. We show how a graph metric
known as ‘strong-robustness’ (introduced in our prior work
[14]) can help tolerate higher erasure probabilities, while
guaranteeing mean-square stability of the estimation error
dynamics. Finally, we emphasize that all our results apply
to a sophisticated and worst-case adversarial model (termed
Byzantine adversaries) which is typically considered in the
literature on resilient distributed algorithms [17]–[20] .
2Here, by a centralized system, we refer to a system where the measure-
ments of all the sensors are available at a single location.
II. SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODEL
Notation: A directed graph is denoted by G = (V , E),
where V = {1, · · · , N} is the set of nodes and E ⊆ V × V
represents the edges. An edge from node j to node i, denoted
by (j, i), implies that node j can transmit information to
node i. The neighborhood of the i-th node is defined as
Ni , {j | (j, i) ∈ E}. The notation |V| is used to denote the
cardinality of a set V . Throughout the rest of this paper, we
use the terms ‘edges’ and ‘communication links/channels’
interchangeably. The set of all eigenvalues (modes) of a
matrix A is denoted by sp(A) = {λ ∈ C | det(A−λI) = 0}
and the set of all marginally stable and unstable eigenvalues
of A is denoted by ΛU (A) = {λ ∈ sp(A) | |λ| ≥ 1}. We
use diag(A1, · · · ,A2) to refer to a block-diagonal matrix
with the matrix Ai as the i-th block entry. The notation Z≥0
is used to denote the set of all non-negative integers, and for
a random variable X, its expected value is denoted by E[X].
System Model: Consider the linear dynamical system
x[k + 1] = Ax[k], (1)
where k ∈ Z is the discrete-time index, x[k] ∈ Rn is the state
vector and A ∈ Rn×n is the system matrix. The system is
monitored by a network G = (V , E) consisting of N nodes.
The i-th node has partial measurement of the state x[k]:
yi[k] = Cix[k], (2)
where yi[k] ∈ Rri and Ci ∈ Rri×n. We denote y[k] =[
yT1 [k] · · · y
T
N [k]
]T
, and C =
[
CT1 · · · C
T
N
]T
.
In the standard distributed state estimation problem, each
node is required to estimate the state x[k] using its own mea-
surements and the information received from its neighbors,
where such information flow is restricted by the underlying
communication graph G. A challenging scenario emerges
when one seeks to solve the same problem in the presence of
malicious nodes in the network. We now formally describe
the adversary model considered throughout the paper.
Adversary Model: We consider a subset A ⊂ V of
the nodes in the network to be adversarial. We assume
that the adversarial nodes are completely aware of the
network topology (and any variations to such topology
due to communication drop-outs), the system dynamics and
the algorithm employed by the non-adversarial nodes. In
terms of capabilities, an adversarial node can leverage the
aforementioned information to arbitrarily deviate from the
rules of any prescribed algorithm, while colluding with
other adversaries in the process. Furthermore, following
the Byzantine fault model [21], adversaries are allowed
to send differing state estimates to different neighbors at
the same instant of time. This assumption of omniscient
adversarial behavior is standard in the literature on resilient
and secure distributed algorithms [17]–[20], and allows us to
provide guarantees against “worst-case” adversarial behavior.
In terms of their density in the network, we assume that
there are at most f adversarial nodes in the neighborhood of
any non-adversarial node; this property will be referred to as
the ‘f -local’ property of the adversarial set. Summarily, the
adversary model described thus far will be called an f -local
Byzantine adversary model. The non-adversarial nodes will
be referred to as regular nodes and be represented by the set
R = V \ A. Finally, note that the number and identities of
the adversarial nodes are not known to the regular nodes.
Objective: Given the LTI system (1), the measurement
model (2), a communication graph G, and the f -local Byzan-
tine adversary model described above, our objective in this
paper is to design state estimate update and information
exchange rules that guarantee asymptotic convergence (in
a deterministic or stochastic sense) of the estimates of the
regular nodes to the true state of the plant, under different
types of communication loss models.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Before developing our estimation strategy, we first es-
tablish certain terminology, notation, and key ideas in this
section. To begin with, the underlying communication graph
G that dictates the flow of information among nodes in the
absence of any communication losses will be referred to as
the baseline communication graph. The loss of communi-
cation between nodes is modeled by a time-varying graph
G[k] = (V , E [k]), where E [k] ⊆ E . Regarding system (1), we
make the following assumption for clarity of exposition.3
Assumption 1. The system matrix A has real, distinct
eigenvalues.
Based on the above assumption, one can perform a coordi-
nate transformation z[k] , Vx[k] on (1), with an appropriate
non-singular matrix V, to obtain4
z[k + 1] = Mz[k] = diag(λ1, · · · , λn)z[k],
yi[k] = C¯iz[k], ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , N}
(3)
where sp(A) = diag(λ1, · · · , λn), M = VAV−1 and C¯i =
CiV
−1. Commensurate with this decomposition, the j-th
component of the state vector z[k] will be denoted by z(j)[k],
and will be referred to as the component corresponding to
the eigenvalue λj . Since recovering z[k] is equivalent to
recovering x[k], we focus on estimating z[k]. To this end,
we will use the following definition of source nodes.
Definition 1. (Source nodes) For each λj ∈ ΛU (A), the set
of nodes that can detect λj is denoted by Sj , and called the
set of source nodes for λj .
Let ΩU (A) ⊆ ΛU (A) contain the set of eigenvalues of A
for which V \Sj is non-empty. Then, for each λj ∈ ΩU (A),
our strategy requires the source nodes Sj to maintain local5
Luenberger observers for estimating z(j)[k], while the non-
source nodes rely on a secure consensus protocol for the
same. For any node i, let the set of eigenvalues it can detect
be denoted by Oi, and let UOi = sp(A) \ Oi. Then, the
3The results presented in this paper can however be extended to system
matrices with arbitrary spectrum via a more detailed technical analysis.
4As this only relies on the knowledge of the system matrix A (which is
assumed to be known by all the nodes), all of the nodes can do this in a
distributed manner.
5Here, by ‘local’ we imply that such observers can be constructed and
run without any information from neighbors.
x[k + 1] = ax[k]
s1 s2
w1 wNwi· · · · · ·
Fig. 1. A scalar unstable plant is monitored by a clique of N + 2 nodes,
where s1 and s2 are the only source nodes. A single adversary corrupting
either of the two sources can render the distributed state estimation problem
impossible, irrespective of the choice of algorithm.
following result from [14] states that node i can estimate
the locally detectable portion of z[k], referred to as zOi [k],
without interacting with its neighbors.
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, for each
regular node i ∈ R and each λj ∈ Oi, a local Lu-
enberger observer can be constructed that ensures that
limk→∞ |zˆ
(j)
i [k] − z
(j)[k]| = 0, where zˆ
(j)
i [k] denotes the
estimate of z(j)[k] maintained by node i.
The real challenge is posed by the task of estimating the
locally undetectable dynamics, since it necessitates commu-
nicating with neighbors, some of whom might be adversarial.
In fact, the traditional metric of graph connectivity which
plays a pivotal role in the analysis of fault-tolerant and
secure distributed algorithms [22], [23], cannot capture the
requirements to be met by a sensor network for addressing
adversarial behavior in the context of distributed state esti-
mation. A simple illustration of this fact is as follows.
Example 1. Consider a scalar unstable plant monitored by a
clique of N+2 nodes, as depicted in Figure 1. Nodes s1 and
s2 are the only nodes with non-zero measurements, i.e., they
are the source nodes for this system. Although this network
is fully connected, the presence of a single adversarial node
makes it impossible for any algorithm to guarantee estima-
tion of x[k] at every regular node. This remains true even
if every regular node possesses knowledge of the network
topology. Specifically, if the adversary compromises one of
the two source nodes, then it can behave in a way that
makes it impossible for the non-source nodes to distinguish
between two different state trajectories of the system, due to
the conflicting information from the two source nodes.6
The above example alludes to the need for a certain
amount of redundancy in the measurement structure and
the network topology. To this end, in [14], we proposed an
algorithm that made use of certain directed acyclic subgraphs
in addressing the secure distributed estimation problem;
properties of such subgraphs are described below.
Definition 2. (Mode Estimation Directed Acyclic Graph
(MEDAG)) For each eigenvalue λj ∈ ΩU (A), suppose there
exists a spanning subgraph Gj = (V , Ej) of G with the
6We omit details of such an attack strategy due to space constraints. For
centralized systems where f sensors are compromised, [6], [8] have shown
that for recovering the state of the system asymptotically, the system must
remain detectable after the removal of any 2f sensors.
following properties.
(i) If i ∈ {V \ Sj} ∩ R, then |N
(j)
i | ≥ 2f + 1, where
N
(j)
i = {l|(l, i) ∈ Ej} represents the neighborhood of
node i in Gj .
(ii) There exists a partition of R into the sets
{L
(j)
0 ,L
(j)
1 , · · · ,L
(j)
Tj
}, where L
(j)
0 = Sj ∩ R,
and if i ∈ L
(j)
m (where 1 ≤ m ≤ Tj), then
N
(j)
i ∩R ⊆
⋃m−1
r=0 L
(j)
r .
Then, we call Gj a Mode Estimation Directed Acyclic
Graph (MEDAG) for λj ∈ ΩU (A).
We say a regular node i ∈ L
(j)
m “belongs to level m”,
where the levels are indicative of the relative distances of
the regular nodes from the source set Sj . The first property
indicates that every regular node i ∈ V \ Sj has at least
(2f + 1) neighbors in the subgraph Gj , while the second
property indicates that all its regular neighbors in such a
subgraph belong to levels strictly preceding its own level. In
essence, the edges of the MEDAG Gj represent a medium for
transmitting information securely from the source nodes Sj
to the non-source nodes, by preventing the adversaries from
forming a bottleneck between such nodes. Intuitively, this
requires redundant nodes and edges, and such a requirement
is met by the first property of the MEDAG.7 Our estimation
scheme (described later) relies on a special information flow
pattern that requires a node i to listen to only its neighbors
in N
(j)
i for estimating z
(j)[k]. The second property of a
MEDAG then indicates that nodes in level m only use the
estimates of regular nodes in levels 0 to m−1 for recovering
z(j)[k]. The implications of such properties will become
apparent during the analysis of our proposed algorithms.
Before proceeding further, we need to understand the prop-
erties of the baseline communication graph G that guarantee
the existence of a MEDAG Gj , ∀λj ∈ ΩU (A). To this end,
we require the following definitions and result from [14].
Definition 3. (r-reachable set) For a graph G = (V , E), a
set S ⊂ V , and an integer r ∈ Z>0, S is an r-reachable set
if there exists an i ∈ S such that |Ni \ S| ≥ r.
Definition 4. (strongly r-robust graph w.r.t. Sj ) For r ∈
Z>0 and λj ∈ ΩU (A), a graph G = (V , E) is strongly
r-robust w.r.t. to the set of source nodes Sj , if for any non-
empty subset C ⊆ V \ Sj , C is r-reachable.
Lemma 2. If G is strongly (2f+1)-robust w.r.t. Sj , for some
λj ∈ ΩU (A), then G contains a MEDAG Gj for λj .
Given a λj ∈ ΩU (A), there might be more than one
subgraph that satisfies the definition of a MEDAG Gj . In
[14], we proposed a distributed algorithm that allowed each
node i to identify the sets N
(j)
i , ∀λj ∈ UOi, by explicitly
constructing a specific MEDAG Gj for each λj ∈ UOi. In
this paper, we assume that these MEDAGs have already been
constructed during a distributed design phase using such an
algorithm, to inform each node i of the set N
(j)
i , ∀λj ∈ UOi.
7In particular, as regards measurement redundancy, note that for each
λj ∈ ΩU (A), a MEDAG Gj contains atleast (2f + 1) source nodes that
can detect λj .
It will be important to keep in mind that the sets N
(j)
i are
time-invariant as they correspond to specific MEDAGs.
IV. SECURE STATE ESTIMATION OVER TIME-VARYING
NETWORKS
In this section, we develop an algorithm that enables
each regular node to estimate its locally undetectable por-
tion subject to arbitrary adversarial attacks and intermittent
communication losses that satisfy the following criterion.
Assumption 2. There exists T ∈ Z>0 such that ∀k ≥
T,
⋃T
τ=0 G[k − τ ] contains the MEDAG Gj for each λj ∈
ΩU (A).
Note that under the above communication failure model,
G[k] may not contain the specific MEDAGs constructed dur-
ing the design phase for some (or all) k, thereby precluding
direct use of the technique developed in [14]. However, such
MEDAGs will be preserved in the union graph over the
interval [k − T, k], ∀k ≥ T . For this model, we assume that
all estimates being transmitted by regular nodes are properly
time-stamped, and propose the following algorithm.
For each λj ∈ UOi, a regular node i updates its estimate
of z(j)[k] in the following manner.
1) At every time-step k, node i collects the most recent
estimate of z(j)[k] received from each node l ∈ N
(j)
i ,
along with the corresponding time-stamp φil[k] ∈ Z≥0.
It then evaluates the delay τil[k] = k − φil[k] and
computes the quantity z¯
(j)
il [k] , λj
τil[k]zˆ
(j)
l [k−τil[k]].
8
Prior to receiving the first estimate from a node l ∈
N
(j)
i , the value z¯
(j)
il [k] is maintained at 0 by node i.
9
2) The values z¯
(j)
il [k] are sorted from largest to smallest;
subsequently, the largest f and the smallest f of such
values are discarded (i.e., 2f values are discarded in
all) and zˆ
(j)
i [k] is updated as
zˆ
(j)
i [k + 1] = λj
(∑
l∈M
(j)
i
[k]
w
(j)
il [k]z¯
(j)
il [k]
)
, (4)
where M
(j)
i [k] ⊂ N
(j)
i represents the set of nodes
whose (potentially) delayed estimates are used by node
i at time-step k after the removal of the 2f aforemen-
tioned values. Node i assigns the consensus weight
w
(j)
il [k] to node l at time-step k for estimating the
component of the state corresponding to the eigenvalue
λj . The weights w
(j)
il [k] are non-negative and satisfy∑
l∈M
(j)
i
[k]
w
(j)
il [k] = 1, ∀λj ∈ UOi.
We refer to the above algorithm as the Sliding Window
Local-Filtering based Secure Estimation (SW-LFSE) algo-
rithm. We comment on certain features of this algorithm and
then proceed to analyze its convergence properties.
8For notational simplicity, while considering the eigenvalue λj , we drop
the superscript ‘j’ on the time-stamp φil[k] and the delay τil[k].
9If node i receives an estimate without a time-stamp from some node in
N
(j)
i ∩A, it simply assigns a value of 0 to such an estimate (without loss of
generality). Note that based on Assumption 2, node i is guaranteed to receive
a time-stamped estimate from every regular node l inN
(j)
i at least once over
every interval of the form [k−T, k], ∀k ≥ T , i.e., for each l ∈ N
(j)
i ∩R,
z¯
(j)
il
[k] will necessarily be of the form λj
τil[k]zˆ
(j)
l
[k− τil[k]], ∀k ≥ T .
Remark 1. Like the LFSE algorithm in [14], the SW-
LFSE algorithm also relies on a two-stage filtering strategy.
Specifically, the first stage of filtering corresponds to a
regular node i ∈ V \ Sj listening to only its neighbors
N
(j)
i ⊆ Ni in the MEDAG Gj .
10 The second stage of
filtering requires node i to discard certain extreme values
received from nodes in N
(j)
i .
11 A key point of difference
between the algorithms is that in the SW-LFSE approach,
at each time-step k, node i needs to store the most recent
(potentially) delayed estimate received from each neighbor in
N
(j)
i . Consequently, we require the regular nodes to possess
adequate memory.
Remark 2. Our approach does not require the nodes to have
a priori knowledge of the value of T in Assumption 2.
Remark 3. Our results will continue to hold if in step 2
of the SW-LFSE algorithm, node i simply uses the median
value of z¯
(j)
il [k], l ∈ N
(j)
i , in the update rule (4). Although
this can reduce computation, the present approach offers a
degree of freedom in choosing the weights w
(j)
il [k], that can
be potentially leveraged to account for issues like noise.
Remark 4. As alluded to earlier in the introduction, this
communication-loss model offers the adversaries the addi-
tional opportunity of sending false information regarding
the time-stamps of their estimates.12 Nevertheless, as we
establish in the next section, our proposed algorithm is
immune to such misbehavior.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SW-LFSE ALGORITHM
The following is the main result of this section.
Theorem 1. Given an LTI system (1) and a measurement
model (2), let the baseline communication graph G be
strongly (2f + 1)-robust w.r.t. Sj , ∀λj ∈ ΩU (A). Further-
more, let Assumptions 1 and 2 be met. Then, the proposed
SW-LFSE algorithm guarantees the following despite the
actions of any set of f -local Byzantine adversaries.
• (Asymptotic Stability) Each regular node i ∈ R can
asymptotically estimate the state of the plant, i.e.,
limk→∞ ||xˆi[k] − x[k]|| = 0, ∀i ∈ R, where xˆi[k] is
the estimate of the state x[k] maintained by node i.
• (Rate of Convergence) Let e
(j)
i [k] = zˆ
(j)
i [k] − z
(j)[k]
denote the error in estimation of the component z(j)[k]
by a regular node i ∈ V \ Sj . Then, if node i belongs
to level q of the MEDAG Gj , its estimation error e
(j)
i [k]
satisfies the following inequality ∀k ≥ (T + 1)q:
|e
(j)
i [k]| ≤ β
(j)
[
(N − (2f + 1))
(
|λj |
γ(j)
)(T+1)]q
(γ(j))
k
, (5)
10This operation ensures a uni-directional flow of information from the
source nodes Sj (some of whom might also be adversarial) to the rest of
the network.
11Whereas the first stage of filtering is specific to our distributed state
estimation approach, the second stage of filtering is similar to the W-MSR
algorithm employed in the secure consensus literature [17], [18].
12In other words, due to false time-stamp information, the quantity
zˆ
(j)
l
[k− τil[k]] may not represent the true estimate of an adversarial node
l at time (k − τil[k]). Thus, we resort to a slight abuse of notation here.
where β(j) > 0 and γ(j) ∈ (0, 1) are certain constants.
Proof. Note that for each regular node i, the state vector z[k]
can be partitioned into the components zOi [k] and zUOi [k]
that correspond to the detectable and undetectable eigenval-
ues, respectively, of node i. Based on Lemma 1, we know
that node i can estimate zOi [k] asymptotically via a locally
constructed Luenberger observer. It remains to show that
node i can recover zUOi [k], or in other words, for each λj ∈
UOi, we need to prove that limk→∞ |zˆ
(j)
i [k]− z
(j)[k]| = 0.
Equivalently, we show that for each λj ∈ ΩU (A), every
regular node i ∈ V \ Sj can asymptotically recover z(j)[k].
Consider an eigenvalue λj ∈ ΩU (A). Since E [k] ⊆ E
for all k, Assumption 2 can hold only if the baseline graph
G contains Gj . The latter follows from the conditions of
the Theorem and Lemma 2. Next, based on Assumption
2, notice that for all k ≥ T , the union of the graphs over
the interval [k − T, k] contains the MEDAG Gj . Recall that
the sets {L
(j)
0 ,L
(j)
1 , · · · ,L
(j)
q , · · · L
(j)
Tj
} form a partition of
the set of regular nodes R in such a MEDAG. We prove
the desired result by inducting on the level number q. For
q = 0, L
(j)
0 = Sj ∩ R from definition, and hence all
nodes in level 0 can estimate z(j)[k] asymptotically by virtue
of Lemma 1. Next, consider a regular node i in L
(j)
1 and
let e
(j)
i [k] , zˆ
(j)
i [k] − z
(j)[k]. We first analyze the SW-
LFSE update rule (4). To this end, at each time-step k,
let the neighbor set N
(j)
i of node i be partitioned into
the sets U
(j)
i [k],M
(j)
i [k] and J
(j)
i [k], where U
(j)
i [k] and
J
(j)
i [k] contain f nodes each, with the highest and the
lowest values of z¯
(j)
il [k] respectively, and M
(j)
i [k] contains
the remaining nodes in N
(j)
i . At any instant k, we can
either have M
(j)
i [k] ∩ A = 0 or M
(j)
i [k] ∩ A 6= 0. In the
former case, all nodes in M
(j)
i [k] belong to L
(j)
0 = Sj ∩R.
In the latter case, when node i uses values transmitted by
adversarial nodes in its update rule, it follows from the SW-
LFSE algorithm, the f -locality of the adversary model, and
the fact that |N
(j)
i | ≥ (2f+1), that for each l ∈ M
(j)
i [k]∩A,
there exists a node u ∈ U
(j)
i [k] and a node v ∈ J
(j)
i [k]
such that both u, v ∈ L
(j)
0 , and z¯
(j)
iv [k] ≤ z¯
(j)
il [k] ≤ z¯
(j)
iu [k],
i.e., z¯
(j)
il [k] can be expressed as a convex combination of
z¯
(j)
iu [k] and z¯
(j)
iv [k].
13 Based on the above discussion and (4),
it follows that for all k, zˆ
(j)
i [k + 1] belongs to the convex
hull formed by λj z¯
(j)
il [k], l ∈ L
(j)
0 . Specifically, there exist
weights w¯
(j)
il [k] such that
∑
l∈N
(j)
i
∩L
(j)
0
w¯
(j)
il [k] = 1, and
zˆ
(j)
i [k + 1] = λj
(∑
l∈N
(j)
i
∩L
(j)
0
w¯
(j)
il [k]z¯
(j)
il [k]
)
. (6)
Since
∑
l∈N
(j)
i
∩L
(j)
0
w¯
(j)
il [k] = 1, and z
(j)[k+1] = λjz
(j)[k]
based on (3), we obtain
z(j)[k + 1] = λj
(∑
l∈N
(j)
i
∩L
(j)
0
w¯
(j)
il [k]λj
τil[k]z(j)[k − τil[k]]
)
.
(7)
13Explicit dependence of u, v on the parameters represented by i, j, l and
k is not shown to avoid cluttering of the exposition.
Based on Assumption 2 and step 1 of the SW-LFSE update
rule, we have that for all k ≥ T , z¯
(j)
il [k] = λj
τil[k]zˆ
(j)
l [k −
τil[k]], l ∈ N
(j)
i ∩ L
(j)
0 . Subtracting (7) from (6), we then
obtain the following error dynamics for all k ≥ T :
e
(j)
i [k + 1] = λj
(∑
l∈N
(j)
i ∩L
(j)
0
w¯
(j)
il [k]λj
τil[k]e
(j)
l [k − τil[k]]
)
. (8)
Noting that the weights w¯
(j)
il [k] belong to [0, 1], the delay
terms τil[k] are upper bounded by T for l ∈ N
(j)
i ∩ R, λj
satisfies |λj | ≥ 1, and using the triangle inequality, we obtain
the following based on (8) for all k ≥ T :
|e
(j)
i [k + 1]| ≤ |λj |
(T+1)
(∑
l∈N
(j)
i
∩L
(j)
0
|e
(j)
l [k − τil[k]]|
)
. (9)
For every l ∈ L
(j)
0 , since e
(j)
l [k] converges asymptoti-
cally, and hence exponentially (the local Luenberger ob-
server based dynamics are linear) based on Lemma 1, there
exist constants c
(j)
l > 0 and γ
(j)
l ∈ (0, 1) such that
|e
(j)
l [k]| ≤ c
(j)
l (γ
(j)
l )
k
. Let β(j) , max
l∈L
(j)
0
c
(j)
l and γ
(j) ,
max
l∈L
(j)
0
γ
(j)
l . Then, we obtain the following inequality
based on (9) for all k ≥ T :
|e
(j)
i [k + 1]| ≤ |λj |
(T+1)|M
(j)
i [k]|β
(j)(γ(j))
(k−T )
. (10)
Finally, note that based on the rules of the SW-LFSE
algorithm, at each time-step k ≥ T , node i discards 2f
values and does not use its own estimate in the update rule
(4). Hence, we have |M
(j)
i [k]| ≤ (N − (2f + 1)). Thus, we
obtain (5) for q = 1, implying exponential stability of the
error dynamics (8) for all nodes in level 1, since γ(j) ∈ (0, 1).
Suppose asymptotic stability holds for nodes in all levels
from 0 to q (where 1 ≤ q ≤ Tj − 1). It is easy to see that
the result holds for all nodes in L
(j)
q+1 as well, by noting that
(i) a regular node i ∈ L
(j)
q+1 has N
(j)
i ∩ R ⊆
⋃q
r=0 L
(j)
r ,
and (ii) any value z¯
(j)
il [k] used by node i in the update rule
(4) lies in the convex hull formed by z¯
(j)
iu [k], u ∈
⋃q
r=0 L
(j)
r .
Based on the induction hypothesis, asymptotic stability can
then be argued using the same reasoning as the q = 1 case.
Verifying (5) is a matter of straightforward algebra.
The above arguments can be used almost identically to
analyze the impact of bounded communication delays (poten-
tially random, time-varying) in the presence of adversaries,
for static networks.14 We formalize this observation below.
Corollary 1. Given an LTI system (1) satisfying Assumption
1, and a measurement model (2), let G[k] = G ∀k, where
G is strongly (2f + 1)-robust w.r.t. Sj , ∀λj ∈ ΩU (A).
Furthermore, let communication delays between any pair of
regular nodes in G be bounded by some T ∈ Z>0. Then, the
proposed SW-LFSE algorithm provides identical guarantees
as in Theorem 1.
We conclude this section with the following remark.
Remark 5. For each unstable/ marginally stable eigenvalue
of the system, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 explicitly relate the
14Here, by a bounded communication delay we imply that if (i, j) ∈ E
and i, j ∈ R, then any estimate transmitted by node i to node j at time-step
k, is received by node j no later than time-step k+T , for some T ∈ Z>0.
rates of convergence of the different non-source nodes to the
the instability of the system mode under consideration, the
delay upper bound T , and the respective distances of such
nodes (captured by the different levels ‘q’ of a MEDAG) from
the corresponding sources of information.
VI. SECURE STATE ESTIMATION OVER ANALOG
ERASURE CHANNELS
In this section, we explore the problem of secure dis-
tributed state estimation over a network where each com-
munication link is modeled by an analog erasure channel as
defined in [24]. Specifically, the transmission of information
across any link (i, j) ∈ E is governed by a random process
ξij [k] that is memoryless, i.e., ξij [k] is i.i.d. over time.
Furthermore, across space, the packet dropping processes
over different links are independent. For any k, the random
variable ξij [k] follows a Bernoulli fading distribution, i.e.,
ξij [k] = 0 with erasure probability p and ξij [k] = 1 with
probability (1 − p); the implications of ξij [k] assuming the
values 0 and 1 will be discussed shortly.
Our objective in this section will be to design a secure
distributed state estimation protocol that guarantees mean-
square stability of the estimation error dynamics for each
regular node, in the following sense.
Definition 5. (Mean-Square Stability (MSS)) The estima-
tion error dynamics of the regular nodes is said to be mean-
square stable if limk→∞ E[||ei[k]||2] = 0, ∀i ∈ R, where
ei[k] = xˆi[k]−x[k], and the expectation is taken with respect
to the packet dropping processes ξij [k], (i, j) ∈ E .
A. Channels with no delay
We first consider the case where ξij [k] = 1 implies that
any data packet transmitted by node i at time k is received
perfectly by node j at time k, and when ξij [k] = 0, such a
packet is dropped completely. For this model, we propose a
simple algorithm described as follows.
For each λj ∈ UOi, a regular node i updates its estimate
of z(j)[k] in the following manner.
• At each time-step k, if it receives estimates from at least
(2f+1) nodes in N
(j)
i , it runs the LFSE algorithm, i.e.,
it removes the largest f and the smallest f estimates
zˆ
(j)
l [k], l ∈ N
(j)
i and updates zˆ
(j)
i [k] as
zˆ
(j)
i [k + 1] = λj
(∑
l∈M
(j)
i
[k]
w
(j)
il [k]zˆ
(j)
l [k]
)
, (11)
where the set M
(j)
i [k] and the weights w
(j)
il [k] are
defined as in the description of the SW-LFSE algorithm
in Section IV. Otherwise, it runs open-loop as follows:
zˆ
(j)
i [k + 1] = λj zˆ
(j)
i [k]. (12)
The above algorithm provides the following guarantees.
Theorem 2. Given an LTI system (1) satisfying Assumption
1, and a measurement model (2), let the baseline communi-
cation graph G be strongly (mf +1)-robust w.r.t. Sj , ∀λj ∈
ΩU (A), where m ∈ Z>0. For each (i, j) ∈ E , let ξij [k] be a
Bernoulli packet dropping process with erasure probability
p, that is i.i.d. over time and independent of packet dropping
processes over other links. Suppose m ≥ 3 and that the
following is true:15
ρ2p¯ < 1, (13)
where ρ is the spectral radius of A, and
p¯ , 1−
(m−1)f+1∑
l=(2f+1)
(
(m− 1)f + 1
l
)
(1− p)lp(m−1)f+(1−l).
(14)
Then, the secure distributed state estimation algorithm de-
scribed by the update rules (11) and (12) guarantees mean-
square stability in the sense of Definition 5, despite the
actions of any f -local set of Byzantine adversaries
Proof. Note that the packet dropping processes do not affect
the estimation of the locally detectable portions of the state,
i.e., each regular node i can recover zOi [k] asymptotically
based on Lemma 1. Consider λj ∈ ΩU (A). Since G is
strongly (mf + 1)-robust w.r.t. Sj , a trivial extension of
Lemma 2 implies that in the MEDAG Gj , |N
(j)
i | ≥ (mf +
1), ∀i ∈ {V \ Sj} ∩R. We induct on the level numbers q of
such a MEDAG Gj present in the baseline communication
graph G. Let i be a node in level 1. Let Ii[k] be an indicator
random variable16 such that Ii[k] = 1 if node i uses the
update rule (12) and Ii[k] = 0 if node i uses the update rule
(11). To make the presentation clear, we make the following
assumption. Suppose node i receives estimates from more
than (2f + 1) nodes in N
(j)
i at a certain time-step k. Then,
after removing 2f estimates based on the LFSE algorithm, it
listens to only a single node picked arbitrarily fromM
(j)
i [k],
while running (11).17 Combining (11) and (12), we obtain
zˆ
(j)
i [k + 1] = λj
(
Ii[k]zˆ
(j)
i [k] + (1− Ii[k])zˆ
(j)
l [k]
)
, (15)
where l ∈ M
(j)
i [k]. It is easy to see that the error e
(j)
i [k] =
zˆ
(j)
i [k]− z
(j)[k] follows the dynamics:
e
(j)
i [k + 1] = λj
(
Ii[k]e
(j)
i [k] + (1− Ii[k])e
(j)
l [k]
)
. (16)
Defining σ
(j)
i [k] , E[(e
(j)
i [k])
2
], and using (16), we obtain:
σ
(j)
i [k + 1] =λ
2
jE[I
2
i [k]]σ
(j)
i [k] + λ
2
jE[(1− Ii[k])
2]σ
(j)
l [k]
+ 2λ2jE[Ii[k]− I
2
i [k]]E[(e
(j)
i [k])(e
(j)
l [k])]︸ ︷︷ ︸
g[k]
,
=λ2jp
(j)
i [k]σ
(j)
i [k] + λ
2
j (1− p
(j)
i [k])σ
(j)
l [k],
≤ (λ2j p¯)σ
(j)
i [k] + λ
2
jσ
(j)
l [k], (17)
where l ∈ M
(j)
i [k] and p
(j)
i [k] is the probability that Ii[k] =
1. We now justify each of the above steps. For arriving at
the first equality, we used the fact that e
(j)
i [k] is independent
of Ii[k] for any i ∈ R, based on the update rules (11)
15The choice of m ≥ 3 is justified in Remark 8.
16To avoid cluttering the exposition, we drop the superscript ‘j’ on Ii[k]
and certain other terms throughout the proof, since they can be inferred
from context.
17The result continues to hold for the general update rule (11).
and (12), and the nature of the packet dropping processes.
The fact that e
(j)
l [k] (where l ∈ M
(j)
i [k]) is independent of
Ii[k] requires further arguments. In particular, suppose node
l is adversarial and has precise knowledge of the number of
packets received by node i at time-step k, i.e., suppose node l
knows Ii[k]. The estimate zˆ
(j)
l [k] it transmits to node i might
then be influenced by the knowledge of Ii[k]. Irrespective of
such knowledge, whenever l ∈M
(j)
i [k], based on the LFSE
update rule (11) and the f -locality of the adversarial model,
it follows from arguments identical to those in Theorem
1 that e
(j)
l [k] can be expressed as a convex combination
of e
(j)
u [k] and e
(j)
v [k], for some u, v ∈ L
(j)
0 . Since such
nodes are regular, their errors at time k are independent
of Ii[k], and converge to 0 since L
(j)
0 = Sj ∩ R. Thus,
for any l ∈ M
(j)
i [k], e
(j)
l [k] and Ii[k] are independent, and
limk→∞ σ
(j)
l [k] = 0. Also, since Ii[k] is an indicator random
variable, E[Ii[k]] = E[I2i [k]]. Hence, g[k] = 0 leading to the
second equality in (17).
For arriving at the final inequality, we first note that
p
(j)
i [k] can potentially vary over time and across different
nodes since the adversarial nodes are allowed to behave
arbitrarily. In particular, a compromised node may choose
not to transmit estimates even if all out-going communication
links from such a node are intact. Thus, since it is impossible
to exactly compute p
(j)
i [k], we instead seek to upper-bound
it. To this end, note that the probability that Ii[k] = 0, i.e.,
the probability that node i receives estimates from at least
(2f + 1) nodes in N
(j)
i at time k, is lower bounded by the
probability that it receives estimates from at least (2f + 1)
nodes in N
(j)
i ∩ R at time k. The latter probability can be
further lower bounded by (1− p¯) (where p¯ is given by (14))
by noting that |N
(j)
i ∩R| ≥ ((m− 1)f +1) based on the f -
locality of the fault model. In light of the above discussion,
we have p
(j)
i [k] ≤ p¯, leading to the last inequality in (17).
Finally, equation (13) implies that λ2j p¯ < 1, and in turn
guarantees that limk→∞ σ
(j)
i [k] = 0, based on Input to State
Stability (ISS) and the foregoing discussion.
Suppose limk→∞ σ
(j)
i [k] = 0 for all nodes in levels 0 to
q. Consider a node i ∈ L
(j)
q+1[k]. Its error dynamics evolves
based on (17), with g[k] = 0 for reasons discussed above,
and e
(j)
l [k] = α
(j)
il [k]e
(j)
u [k] + (1− α
(j)
il [k])e
(j)
v [k], for some
α
(j)
il [k] ∈ [0, 1], and some u, v ∈
⋃q
r=0L
(j)
r . The last argu-
ment follows from the LFSE update rule (11). Since σ
(j)
u [k]
and σ
(j)
v [k] converge to 0 based on the induction hypothesis,
the term E[(e
(j)
u [k])(e
(j)
v [k])] appearing in σ
(j)
l [k] can be
upper-bounded by
√
σ
(j)
u [k]σ
(j)
v [k] by virtue of the Cauchy-
Schwartz inequality. This implies limk→∞ σ
(j)
l [k] = 0, ∀ l ∈
M
(j)
i [k]. The rest of the proof can be completed following
similar arguments as the q = 1 case.
The term p¯ appearing in (13) and (14) can be interpreted as
the effective packet drop/erasure probability for the problem
under study. With this in mind, the implications of the above
result are described as follows.
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Fig. 2. Plot illustrating how the effective packet drop probability p¯ can be
reduced by increasing the level of robustness m. For this example, ρ = 2
and f = 3.
Remark 6. (Increasing ‘network robustness’ reduces ‘ef-
fective packet drop probability’) Given knowledge of the
spectral radius ρ of A, an upper-bound f on the number
of adversaries in the neighborhood of any regular node,
and the erasure probability p of the communication network,
suppose we are faced with the problem of designing a
network topology that guarantees mean-square stability in
the sense of Definition 5. Theorem 2 provides an answer
to this problem by quantitatively relating our notion of
‘strong-robustness’ in Definition 4 to the effective packet
drop probability p¯. For instance, as shown in Figure 2,
given the parameters ρ, f and p, one can generate a plot
for ρ2p¯ offline, and choose m to satisfy the MSS criterion
ρ2p¯ < 1. Subsequently, one can proceed to design a network
that is strongly (mf +1)-robust w.r.t. Sj , λj ∈ ΩU (A). It is
easy to verify that p¯ is monotonically increasing in p, and
monotonically decreasing in m. In other words, for a fixed
ρ and f , one can tolerate higher erasure probabilities p by
increasing the robustness parameter m.
Remark 7. Note that when f = 0, i.e., in the absence
of adversaries, equation (13) reduces to ρ2p < 1. This
condition is reminiscent of the MSS criterion for remote
stabilization of an LTI system over a Bernoulli packet
dropping channel [25]. This observation can be explained by
viewing the contribution due to the LFSE update (11) (that
helps stabilize the error dynamics (16)) as an analogue of
the stabilizing input in the remote stabilization problem.
Remark 8. We must justify the need for m ≥ 3 in Theorem
2. For a network that is strongly (mf+1)-robust withm ≤ 2,
each adversarial node may follow the simple strategy of
never transmitting its estimate. If the adversaries compromise
f nodes in some set N
(j)
i , where i ∈ R and λj ∈ UOi,
then such a strategy might cause the regular node i to
run open-loop forever based on the algorithm described by
the update rules (11) and (12). Instead of running open-
loop, suppose that if a regular node i does not hear from
some neighbor in N
(j)
i at time k, it assigns a value of 0
to the corresponding estimate, and then employs the LFSE
update rule (11). Such an approach will in general not work
either, due to the following reason. Unlike the communication
loss model studied in Section IV, where each regular node
was guaranteed to receive estimates from ‘enough’ regular
neighbors over bounded intervals of time, no such guarantees
can be claimed for the analog erasure channel model studied
here. Thus, while strongly (2f + 1)-robust networks sufficed
in Section IV, the choice of m ≥ 3 is in fact necessary in
the present context for achieving MSS based on our specific
approach. However, m = 2 does suffice for certain variants
of the analog erasure channel model, as we discuss next.
B. Channels with erasure and delay
In this section, we consider a variant of the analog erasure
channel that accounts for the presence of random delays. To
this end, let (i, j) ∈ E , and let v[k] be a message transmitted
by node i to node j at time-step k. Then, a channel with delay
and erasure causes node j to receive the following message:
r[k] = ξij [k]v[k] + (1− ξij [k])v[k − τij [k]], (18)
where ξij [k] is the memory-less packet dropping process
described earlier, τij [k] ∈ Z>0 is a random delay satisfying
1 ≤ τij [k] ≤ T , and T ∈ Z>0. In words, the channel output
r[k] is either equal to the present channel input v[k] with
probability (1 − e), or equal to a delayed channel input
with probability e, where the delay is upper bounded by
some positive constant T . It should be noted that the erasure
channel model considered here is a generalization of the
erasure channel with delay in [24], where the delays are
constant. For this model, we have the following result.
Proposition 1. Given an LTI system (1) satisfying Assump-
tion 1, and a measurement model (2), let the baseline
communication graph G be strongly (2f + 1)-robust w.r.t.
Sj , ∀λj ∈ ΩU (A). Let each communication link of G be
modeled as a channel with delay and erasure as described
by equation (18). Then, the SW-LFSE algorithm provides
identical guarantees as in Theorem 1, with probability 1.
Proof. The proof follows from the following simple obser-
vation: based on the channel model (18), note that for each
λj ∈ ΩU (A), every regular node i ∈ V \Sj is guaranteed to
receive a state estimate that is at most T time-steps delayed,
from each of its regular neighbors in N
(j)
i , at every time-step
k, ∀k ≥ T . This corresponds to a special case of the bounded
delay model in Corollary 1, and the result thus follows.
VII. CONCLUSION
We developed secure distributed state estimation algo-
rithms that account for adversarial nodes in the presence of
communication losses, both deterministic and stochastic. For
the former case, we characterized the convergence rate of our
algorithm in terms of certain system and network properties,
and for the latter scenario involving analog erasure channels,
we established that our notion of ‘strong-robustness’ plays an
important role in tolerating high erasure probabilities while
ensuring mean-square stability. As future work, it would be
interesting to explore if exploiting sensor memory like the
SW-LFSE approach in Section IV can help tolerate higher
erasure probabilities for the analog erasure channel model
considered in Section VI-A.
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